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NOTE
REDEFINING MANAGEMENT PARTICIPATION FOR
CERCLA'S SECURED LENDER EXEMPTION:
UNITED STATES v. FLEET FACTORS CORP.
INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)' created a powerful means of imposing liability
on those responsible for the improper disposal of hazardous wastes. An
"owner or operator" of a facility is among the primary parties liable
under CERCLA.' In drafting CERCLA, Congress provided an exemption
from its definition of owner or operator commonly referred to as "the
secured lender exemption."' The secured lender exemption allows creditors Who do not participate in the management of a facility to maintain
limited "indicia of ownership," 4 in order to protect their security inter-

ests.' The scope of the exception depends on how one defines "participating in management." Congress did not define the phrase when it
drafted CERCLA, and subsequent attempts to do so have not met with
success. 6 In United States v. Fleet FactorsCorp.,7 the Eleventh Circuit
announced the first appellate ruling on the degree of management participation sufficient to exceed the exemption and trigger secured lender8
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675 (1988)). See
also Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-949, 100
Stat. 1613-1782 (amending CERCLA of 1980).
2. Section 107(a) of CERCLA, identifies four broad classes of responsible parties that are liable
for cleanup costs. The first two classes include certain owners and operators of facilities containing
hazardous substances. The third class includes persons who arrange for the disposal of hazardous
substances, while the fourth includes persons who accepted for transportation hazardous substances
and selected the disposal facility. Each of the four groups of responsible parties is strictly liable
under section 107(a). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) This note concerns only those parties liable as owners
or operators.
3. CERCLA excludes from the definition of -owner or operator" "a person who, without participating in the management of a ... facility holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest in the ... facility." 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(a).
4. "Indicia of Ownership" describes the interest for which lenders may technically be considered
owners. In this case Fleet held a deed of trust to the SPW plant which, without the protection of
the secured creditor exemption, would bring Fleet under the umbrella of liability. Id.
5. See generally Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participation Under

Section 1OI(20XA) of CERCLA. 98 Yale L.J. 925, 926 (1989) [hereinafter Tom].
6. See infra note 54 and accompanying text for a description of a recent attempt by Congress to
amend the secured lender exemption.
7. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, No. 90504 (Jan. 14, 1991).
8. This casenote will use the terms "secured lender" and "lender" interchangeably. In all cases
however, the reader should assume that the lender is a secured lender.
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liability. The court determined that a lender could incur CERCLA liability
without being an operator of a facility by "participating in the financial
management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence
the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes." 9
This note will discuss the reasoning behind the Fleet Factorsdecision,
and will outline the conflicting policies addressed by the court in determining the limit of permissible management participation by a lender.
After discussing some of the preliminary responses to Fleet Factorsand
the misconceptions it has spawned, this note suggests that the court's
decision would stand on firmer ground if it were based on narrower
grounds.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1976, Swainsboro Print Works (SPW), a Georgia cloth printing
facility, entered into a "factoring""s agreement with Fleet Factors Corp.
(Fleet). Fleet advanced money in return for the profits of SPW's future
accounts receivable. As part of the deal, Fleet obtained security interests
in SPW's equipment, inventory (including chemicals) and fixtures." As
additional collateral, SPW granted Fleet a security interest in its facility. 2
SPW filed for bankruptcy in 1979, but continued operating. Fleet foreclosed on its security interest in some of SPW's inventory and equipment
in May, 1982, and arranged an auction of SPW's excess materials. 3 After
the auction, Fleet hired a contractor to remove the remaining unsold
equipment. The contractor left the facility around December of 1983.
In July of 1987, the United States government filed an action against
Fleet to impose CERCLA cleanup costs associated with the EPA's removal
of 700 55-gallon drums containing toxic chemicals and 44 truckloads of
material containing asbestos from the site. The government claimed that
Fleet asserted sufficient control in the management of SPW's affairs to
be liable as an owner or operator.' 4 Alternatively, the government claimed
9. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
10. "Factoring" is the purchase of a company's accounts receivable by a commercial agent who
thereby assumes the risk of loss in return for some agreed discount. Black's Law Dictionary 532
(5th ed. 1979).
11.Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1552.
12, Fleet obtained a deed which conveyed title to the realty to Fleet. United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 957. (S.D. Ga. 1988).
13. Fleet Factors. 901 F.2d at 1552. Fleet never foreclosed on the real property. Instead, the
property was conveyed to Emanuel County, Georgia, on July 7, 1987, at a foreclosure sale resulting
from SPW's failure to pay state and county taxes. Id. at 1553. Fleet's potential liability for the
cleanup may have influenced the decision not to foreclose. For an analysis of the varying treatments
courts have given to lenders who foreclose on their real property interests, see Note, When A Security
Becomes A Liability: Claims Against Lenders in HazardousWaste Cleanup. 38 Hastings L.J. 1261
(1987).
14. id. at 1556. Fleet allegedly required SPW to seek its approval before shipping goods to
customers, established prices for excess inventory, dictated when and to whom finished goods should
be shipped, determined when employees should be laid off, supervised the activity of the office
administrator at the site, received and processed SPW's employment.and tax forms, and controlled
access to the facility. Id. at 1559.
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that Fleet was an "operator at the time of disposal" under §9607 of
CERCLA because it made decisions affecting the actual disposal of some
of the plant's hazardous chemicals. Fleet denied these claims and invoked
the secured lender exemption.
The federal District Court denied both sides' motions for summary
judgment, concluding that while Fleet did not act as an "owner" or
"operator" prior to arranging the auction and hiring the contractor to
remove what was left, Fleet may have become liable afterward under
§9607 of CERCLA as an "operator at the time of disposal."' 5 The court
found that a genuine issue of fact still remained as to Fleet's exact activities after the auction.
The government claimed that asbestos had been dislodged from pipes
connected to equipment at SPW, either by the contractor Fleet hired to
clean up the facility or by the purchasers of equipment at the auction.
The government also claimed that Fleet controlled the actual disposal of
hazardous wastes at the site by prohibiting SPW from selling several
barrels of chemicals to potential buyers. The district court held that any6
of these assertions, if proven, would remove Fleet from its exempt status.'
In determining that Fleet did not qualify as an owner or operator prior
to the time of the auction, the district court applied a test which originated
in United States v. Mirabile.' The Mirabile test made day-to-day involvement in a company's management the touchstone for removing a
lender from the secured creditor exemption.' 8 As applied by the district
court in Fleet, the Mirabiletest would allow a secured creditor to "provide
...

general, and even isolated instances of specific, management advice

to its debtors without risking CERCLA liability if the secured creditor
does not participate in the day-to-day management of the business ....
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit court overruled the district court's
interpretation of management participation. Under the new ruling, Fleet
could also be liable for the decisions it made before the disputed actions
concerning the liquidation of SPW's inventory and equipment in June of
1982.
The appellate court considered several ways of interpreting the secured
creditor exemption. The government urged that any participation in the
management of a facility should trigger liability. The court rejected this
literal reading, finding it would "largely eviscerate the exemption Congress intended to afford secured creditors."' In contrast, Fleet suggested
that the court apply the same test as the district court and distinguish
participation in the financial management of a facility from day-to-day
15.
16.
fact.
17.
18.

United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 962 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
Id. at 960. At the time of this writing, the district court still has not decided these issues of
15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
Id. at 20,997.

19. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 960.
20. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556 (1lth Cir. 1990).
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or operational management. The court rejected this standard as well,
finding it too permissive toward creditors involved with hazardous wastes."
The Eleventh Circuit settled on a compromise. Under the standard the
court adopted, a secured creditor may incur liability "without being an
operator, by participating in the financial management of a facility to a
degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of
hazardous wastes" 22 (emphasis added). The court explained further that
"[A] secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it
could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose." 2 3 The
new standard leaves plenty of room for speculation because it is not tied
to the facts of the case.'
BACKGROUND
Prior to FleetFactors,only one federal court had addressed the secured
creditor exemption. In United States v. Mirabile, the court held that a
hazardous waste site's secured creditors could be held liable for cleanup25
costs only if they were involved in the operational aspects of the facility.
The Mirabile court characterized certain management decisions by a lender,
such as protecting a site against vandalism and showing the site to prospective buyers, as "prudent and routine steps to protect [a] security
interest." '26 Other decisions by the lender, such as insisting on certain
manufacturing changes and determining the priority in which orders were
filled, could be considered involvement in the site's day-to-day operations
and subject the lender to potential liability.2" The Mirabile court drew a
distinction between participation in "nuts and bolts" operational decisions
concerning waste disposal activities, and the mere financial ability to
control waste disposal activities.2"
At the same time the Mirabile court was silent regarding financial
decisions which directly influence waste disposal. 29 Under Mirabile, it is
21. Id. at 1557.
22. id.
23. Id. at 1558.
24. Fleet unsuccessfully petitioned for rehearing, and was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court
on Jan. 14, 1991. Supra note 7.
25. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,994.
26. Id. See also, Tom, supra note 5, at 930.
27. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,997.
28. The court stated that at least on the facts before it, "mere financial ability to control waste
disposal practices . . ." was not sufficient for the court to impose liability. Id. at 20,994. The court
gleaned support from a legislative history definition of "operator" as "a person who is carrying out
operationalfunctions for the owner of a facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement. Id. (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.).
29: Nor did the court describe how it determined when a lender's management decisions became
operational rather than financial in nature.
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improbable that any isolated management decisions could fit into a "dayto-day" category of management participation. Nevertheless, one could
imagine many different isolated management decisions with grave environmental consequences. 3 Similarly, Mirabile's distinction between
financial and operational decisions seemed to exclude an important source
of a lender's power. Lenders are more likely to "manage" a borrower's
affairs through their control of financial resources than any other means,
and there is a full range of financial decisions that could affect the operation of a business. The Eleventh Circuit saw problems in the Mirabile
standard and attempted to correct them.
ANALYSIS
The Eleventh Circuit's re-definition of the secured lender exemption
significantly expanded the potential for lender liability in CERCLA cleanups. 'At the same time, the court's decision left many unanswered questions, due to some ambiguous language and expansive dicta that confused,
rather than clarified, the secured lender exemption. The court held that
Fleet could be liable under a broad range of acts the government alleged
if the acts were proven.3 ' Ultimately, however, the court relied on its
definition of "management participation" for its ruling. 2 Unfortunately,
the court's definition was removed from the facts before it. The court
created an artificial distinction between management participation and
operator liability that undermined its attempt to improve the Mirabile
standard.33
The government formulated two theories under which Fleet could be
liable under §9607(a)(2). First, Fleet could be liable as an operator for
the decisions it made affecting the disposal of waste. Alternatively, Fleet
could be liable if it participated in the management of SPW to the extent
necessary to remove it from the secured creditor exemption.'
The court
35
addressed only the theory of management participation.
Although the sum of facts showing participation in the management
were identical to those indicating operation, the court insisted the two
S30. As an example, a lender with sufficient control over a company's affairs could prevent a
company from spending sufficient funds to properly manage its hazardous substances. A lender
might in one instance expressly prohibit a company from buying safer, but more expensive containers
for waste storage. This in turn might lead to a chemical spill.
31. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1990).
32. Id. at 1557.
33. The court stated that, "although similar, the phrase 'participating in the management' and
the term 'operator' are not congruent." Id.
34. For a listing of alleged management decisions made by Fleet, see supra note 14.
35. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556 n.6. The court stated: "The sum of the facts alleged by the
government is sufficient to hold Fleet liable under either analysis. In order to avoid repetition, and
because this case fits more snugly under a secured creditor analysis, we will forgo an analysis of
Fleet's liability as an operator." 1d:
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theories were different.' To require a lender to engage in the operational,
"nuts and bolts" aspects of a facility before becoming liable, the court
noted, would render the secured lender exemption meaningless because
that person would already be liable as an operator. 7
On the other hand, Fleet argued that too narrow a definition of the
exemption-i.e., one allowing liability without actual operational activity, would render an exemption for creditors equally meaningless. The
end result could be that lenders with a less than full ownership interest
could be liable under the exemption for activities that would be otherwise
insufficient to incur operator liability."'
Arguably, a narrower definition converts the secured lender exemption
into a new basis of liability. Refusing to accept operator liability as the
minimum standard indicates that management participation requires less
managerial involvement than that required for operator liability." The
court asserted that its ruling would allow a creditor to monitor any aspect
of a debtor's business, and allow "occasional and discrete financial decisions relating to the protection of its security interest without incurring
liability."' The court would have helped both lenders and subsequent
courts by saying which of Fleet's decisions fit into this category.
The Fleet court found support for a standard supporting liability for
financial management indicating a capacity to influence hazardous waste
decisions from CERCLA's legislative history. The court noted that initially there had been no exemption for secured creditors, and that Representative Harsha, who introduced the secured creditor exemption, stated
that the change was necessary to protect creditors: "who hold title to a
... facility, but do not participate in the management or operation and
are not otherwise affiliated with the person leasing or operating the...
facility. . . . "' The court found the use of the word "affiliated" indicated
a "more peripheral degree of involvement" than the day-to-day standard
4 2 Additionally, though not mentioned by the court,
set out in Mirabile.
the disjunctive treatment-management "or" operation-seems to indicate that management participation, independent of operation, is sufficient
to trigger liability. But even if one accepts the court's rationale for construing the management participation narrowly, the question remains:
36. Id. at 1557.
37. Id.
38. Appellant's petition for rehearing at 6, United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901. F2d 1550
(MthCir. 1990) (No. 89-8094).
39. The court implied management participation was a narrower basis of liability than operation
when it said that its analysis fit "more snugly" under a management participation theory. See Fleet
Factors. 901 F.2d at 1556 n.5.
40. Id. at 1558.
41. Senate Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative
History of the CERCLA 945 (Comm. Print 1983).
42. Fleet Factors. 901 F.2d at 1558 n. 1l.
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which management decisions can a lender make under the new standard?
Notwithstanding the court's reassurances, there is very little in the opinion
to tell lenders which financial decisions are discrete enough to satisfy the
requirement that a lender merely act to protect its security interest. The
result is that lenders do not have a well-defined "safe harbor" under the
secured lender exemption.
If the Mirabile court drew a line between financial and day-to-day
decisions that made it difficult to ever find lenders liable,43 the Fleet court
may have thrown its net too far in a direction favoring lender liability."
The Fleet standard requires something less than operation, but leaves the
exact boundaries of permissible management to conjecture; specifically,
it is bounded only by what a court believes a lender could control.
An Alternate Theory of Management Participation
Arguably, the secured lender exemption was intended to relieve lenders
of the "owner" prong of liability. The secured lender exemption allows
lenders to hold onto their security interests without risking liability provided they meet certain conditions-namely that lenders not become
overly entangled in a company's affairs. But to place a lender who strays
from these conditions into an ill-defined category somewhere short of
operator status, as the Eleventh Circuit did, seems pointless, especially
when the resulting liability would be the same.
To simplify the problem of defining the scope of permissible management participation, the best choice would be for courts to classify a lender
who becomes too involved in management as an operator.Classifying a
lender who does not meet the limits of permissible management as an
operator would not reduce the function of the secured creditor exemption.
Rather, it would help ground the circular definition Congress gave to
"operator." Clearly, as soon as one "operates" a facility under CERCLA,
the secured creditor exemption does not apply. The key to defining impermissible management participation lies not in distinguishing it from
operation, but in determining when a lender's management participation
itself becomes operation.
Courts have already come some distance in describing which actions
create "operator" liability. Several cases, for example, have determined
43. See Brief for the Appellees at 43, United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F2d 1550 (11 th
Cir. June 12, 1989) (No. 89-8094) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees).
44. In dicta, the court went so far as to say that it was not necessary for a secured lender to
participate in management decisions relating to hazardous waste to incur liability. Fleet Factors,
901 F.2d at 1558. This seems to expose a lender to unwarranted liability. The court could have ruled
that a lender could incur liability either by acting directly to affect the disposal of hazardous wastes,
or by failing to act in the presence of a duty to do so. A court could infer this duty when a lender
exercised extensive control over a company's affairs. The Fleet court could thus have insured,
consistent with CERCLA, that only responsible parties be held liable.
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the level of control necessary for corporate officers to become liable as
operators.45 One case has characterized the power to affect waste decisions
as a factor contributing to operator liability.' There is certainly plenty
of room to expand operator liability, if a court is so inclined, without
developing a new theory of liability. 47
Environmentalists might be upset by a definition of management participation that mirrored a test for operator liability. It might seem at best
to be an exercise in semantics and at worst, a retreat from the present
Fleet standard. Nonetheless, using a similarly based test would serve two
important functions. First, it would assure lenders that they would not
be more vulnerable to liability than they would be without the secured
lender exemption. Secondly, it would make use of a body of law that has
already begun to develop around the theory of operator liability.
Problems With the Fleet Standard
Fleet Factors provided a problematic definition of management participation. The court's broad dicta that no decision affecting waste is
necessary" for a lender to be liable only adds to lenders' fears. Similarly
troubling is the fact that Fleet does not exempt those management decisions that would encourage compliance with the law, such as requiring
an environmental audit during the course of the loan.49 The Eleventh
Circuit seemed to not worry about the prospect of lenders distancing
themselves from businesses with potential hazardous waste problems.
The court stated that ".

.

. the risk of CERCLA liability will be weighed

into the terms of the loan agreement."' This dicta does nothing to encourage lenders to monitor sites after the initial loan."'
Arguably, Congress never envisioned much post-loan monitoring by
lenders when it drafted the secured lender exemption. A lower threshold
of permissible management participation would thus encourage lenders
to keep out of management activities after the loan. But if Congress
45. E.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I11
S. Ct. 957 (1991); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1985) (discussing operator liability based on amount of control exercised by corporations),
46. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
47. But see Brief for Appellees, supra note 43, at 41 n.28, which reads:
The statutory prohibition against participation in the management for secured creditors
should not be confused with the test currently evolving for direct personal liability for
corporate directors and officers under CERCLA... . That test, which considers the
nature and extent of the officer's participation in the management of the corporation,
is based on traditional principles of agency law and direct corporate liability, not a
statutory prohibition. Under § 107, however, an owner of a facility has no such latitude.
48. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
49. Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste
Cleanup, 38 Hastings L.J. 1261, 1295 (1987) (narrow reading of "'participating in the management"
will impede lenders who wish to guard against illegal dumping).
50. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
51. Tom, supra note 5,at 931 (lenders are effective monitors of hazardous waste sites).
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intended a low threshold of liability, lenders are left with an undesirable
choice; they may either exercise very little control after a loan is initiated
and risk their security, or exercise more control and expose themselves
to liability which may far exceed the value of the security. 2

Implications of the Decision
The banking industry has attacked the Fleet Factorsdecision with a
fervor sparked by fear of becoming a "deep pocket" for CERCLA cleanups. Lenders worry that the Fleet Factors standard will have a chilling
effect on the industry, especially concerning loans to potential polluters
such as dry cleaners or other small businesses." Congress has considered
legislation that would have modified the Fleet'sdefinition of management
participation, but did not pass any of the proposals in its 1990 session.'
The reaction from the courts and from the EPA have been less clear.
A single post-Fleet Factors appeals court decision has addressed management participation at the time of this writing. In re Bergsoe Metal
Corp., 5 a Ninth Circuit decision, dealt with the liability of the port
authority of Pennsylvania for an EPA cleanup of hazardous waste at a
lead recycling plant. The court found that the port authority, which held
paper title to the property and leased it to back the plant, was not liable.
The Ninth Circuit Court cited Fleet, stating:
As did the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors, we hold that a creditor
must, as a threshold matter, exercise actual management authority
before it can be held liable for action or inaction which results in
the discharge of hazardous wastes. Merely having the power to get
involved in management, but failing to exercise it, is not enough. "I
The Bergsoe court neither employed nor rejected the Fleet Factorsstan52. Toman, Environmental Worries Slow Loans to Small Businesses, Wall St. J.,Oct. 4. 1990
at B2. (Miner's Bank of Butte, Montana with working capital of $2.5 million faces $10 million of
CERCLA liability as a secured creditor for a site it owned for only three months after a business
failed.)
53. E.g.. Bureau of National Affairs Toxics Law Daily (Aug. 1. 1990) (American Bankers
Association calls for legislation to "restore" secured lender exemption) (available on Westlaw in
BNA-TLD database).
54. There were two proposed bills, H.R. 4494 introduced by Rep. La Falce and S.2319 by Sen.
Gam. 101st Cong. 2d. Sess. (1990). While the proposed bills did not pass, a proposed interpretive
rule by the EPA addressed many of the concerns raised by these bills. Proposed Draft Rule on
Lender Liability Under CERCLA with Accompanying Letter from EPA to OMB (Jan. 24, 1991) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 subpart L) [hereinafter Proposed Rule].
55. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
56. Id. at 673 n.3. Fleet's petition for writ of certiorari claims that the Bergsoe court's insistence
on actual management conflicts with Fleet Factors, where the inference of ability to control hazardous
waste is enough to incur liability. Petitioner's Writ of Certiorari at 6, United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990). However, it seems that both courts agree that there first
must be some actual management before liability may attach. Whether or not the Bergsoe court
would infer the ability to control waste disposal in the manner claimed by Fleet is unclear, but the
Bergsoe court here implies that inaction by a lender that leads to the discharge of hazardous wastes,
could result in liability if a lender has already exercised management authority. See In re Bergsoe
Metal Corp., 910 F.2d at 673.
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dard, deciding that the authority's actions did not constitute sufficient
management to even engage in the Fleet Factors analysis. The port authority never exercised its rights under the leases, including the right to
inspect the premises and to reenter and take possession. However, the
court's emphasis on actual management as a threshold to lender liability,
while facially consistent with the holding in Fleet, refocuses Fleet in a
way that may provide some comfort to worried lenders.
The EPA has recently issued a draft of an interpretive rule to clarify
the secured lender exemption.57 Like the Bergsoe opinion, the EPA rule
does not contradict the Fleet holding. Instead the rule cites both Fleet
and Bergsoe, to outline the need for the rule. The interpretive rule states
that while both Fleet and Bergsoe require actual participation to void the
secured lender exemption, Bergsoe did not address the extent to which
a security holder may act to protect its security interest and Fleet did not
discuss what level of financial participation would support the inference
that the security interest holder could influence the treatment of hazardous
waste.58
The EPA rule attempts to outline the boundaries of permissible activities
by a lender. While the rule does not call the Fleet holding into question,
it does address some of the concerns raised by the decision, and attempts
to fill some gaps. For example, the rule states that "actions taken by a
security holder incident to foreclosure that are environmentally beneficial
are not considered to be participation in the management of a facility
within the meaning of the exemption." 59 Further, the draft rule states that
generally, a security holder is considered to be participating in the management of a facility if the security holder has "materially divested the
borrower of, or otherwise is engaged in, the decisionmaking control over
facility operations, particularly with respect to the hazardous substances
present at the facility. "60
Despite its shortcomings, the Eleventh Circuit's definition of management participation in Fleet has arguably been misinterpreted and subjected
to unwarranted criticism. Detractors uniformly read the Eleventh Circuit's
standard to say that a lender needs only the potential for management to
incur liability. However, as Bergsoe points out, Fleet requires actual
financial management as a threshold matter.6 Where Fleet is unnecessarily vague is in its determining when a lender's ability to make decisions
affecting the actual treatment of waste can be inferred from its financial
decisions. What some detractors fail to see is the difference between an
unexercised potential to manage a company's affairs, which does not lead
57. Proposed Rule, supra note 54.
58. Id. at 6-7.
59. Id. at 14.

60. Id.
61. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 P.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990).
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to liability,62 and inaction after active management decisions, which in
some cases could lead directly to a release of hazardous waste.
A major problem with the Fleet decision is that it fails to distinguish
between "good" and "bad" management participation. Under a strict
reading of Fleet, a lender could be liable for management decisions
specifically made to ensure the proper disposal of wastes. However, this
contingency is highly unlikely. If a lender succeeds in eliminating potential problems, any basis for imposing liability disappears. If a lender
does everything within its power to prevent a release and the release still
happens, there will be serious questions of whether the initial decision
to grant the loan was prudent. Nevertheless, under the Fleet test there
might be times when a lender could be liable for the wrong reason.
The management decisions involved in Fleet provided a spectrum of
grounds on which the court could have found liability. By implementing
a standard supported by expansive dicta rather than the facts as pled by
the parties, however, the court lost an opportunity to give lenders needed
guidance in interpreting CERCLA, and to provide courts with an enforceable standard. The court could have distinguished qualitatively between management decisions that support the purposes of CERCLA versus
those that do not. For now, Fleet's apparent unwillingness to decipher a
lender's motives may have the unintended consequence of preventing
lenders from actively pursuing safer disposal practices for their debtors.
CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit was justified in narrowing CERCLA's secured
lender exemption. Before Fleet, a lender could not be responsible for
strictly financial decisions, even those directly linked to improper waste
management. Nor might a lender be held liable for isolated management
decisions that did not fit a seemingly arbitrary "day-to-day" distinction.
However, Fleet'sdefinition of management participation arguably created
a new and potentially unfair basis of liability for lenders.
While the secured lender exemption was not intended to shield lenders
from their environmental blunders, neither was it meant to create a new
class of liability. A workable alternative to the dilemma posed by Fleet
would be for courts to characterize actions which currently classify as
"operation" under CERCLA as the limit of permissible management
participation. In this manner lenders would know that their actions would
be judged against much clearer standards, and that they would receive
the protection the secured lender exemption was intended to provide.
PETER WHITE
62. id. at 673 n.3.

